











This paper provides evidence on the relationship between monetary policy and the
exchange rate in the aftermath of currency crises. It analyzes a large data set of currency crises
in 80 countries in the period 1980 to 1998. The main question addressed is: can monetary
policy significantly alter the probability of reversing the post-crisis undervaluation through
nominal appreciation rather than higher inflation? We find that tight monetary policy facilitates
the reversal of currency undervaluation through nominal appreciation rather than inflation.
When the economy is also facing a banking crisis, depending on the specification, tight
monetary policy may not have the same effect.
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“Tight money in a given financial crisis can serve either to attract funds or to repel them,
depending on the expectations that a rise in interest rates generates. With inelastic expectations
no fear of crisis or of currency depreciation an increase in the discount rate attracts funds from
abroad, and helps provide the cash needed to ensure liquidity; with elastic expectations of
change- of falling prices, bankruptcies, or exchange depreciation- raising the discount rate may
suggest to foreigners the need to take more funds out rather than in.”
Kindelberger (1978)
I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of currency crises, several economies have seen their exchange rates
depreciate beyond what could be justified by fundamentals.  Recent examples of this overshooting
include Indonesia, Korea and Thailand during the Asian crisis in 1997 and Brazil in 1999. In this
situation, policy makers have to decide whether to tighten policies to stabilize the exchange rate,
in particular, whether higher interest rates are the appropriate response. There is a lively debate
in the literature whether tighter monetary policy is effective in these situations. Furman and Stiglitz
(1998) provide a very comprehensive discussion of the various channels whereby high interest
rates may affect the exchange rate.
1
This paper attempts to shed light on this debate by analyzing a large set of large
depreciations in the aftermath of currency crises in the period 1980 to 1998. The analysis of the
effect of tight monetary policy on the exchange rate takes into account three important steps. The
first step is to evaluate whether the exchange rate overshot during the crisis, or in other words,
whether the real exchange rate (RER) has become undervalued and needs to be brought back to
equilibrium. The second step is to identify the mechanisms through which the RER could be
corrected in case it is undervalued. There are two ways to reverse an undervaluation through
nominal currency appreciation or through higher inflation at home than abroad (or a combination
of the two). If avoiding an inflation buildup is an important concern and/or nominal appreciation
is desirable for the benefit of domestic corporate and banking balance sheets, the extent to which
the reversals occur through nominal appreciations is fundamental. The third step is to identify
through which policies and under which circumstances the reversal occurs through nominal
appreciation. In particular, it is important to evaluate whether nominal appreciations occur mainly
in cases where interest rates are kept high. In addition, it is also important to evaluate whether
other economic conditions, for example the state of the banking system, influences the relationship
between interest rates and exchange rates.
Operationally, the paper selects currency crises that have led to large undervaluations of
the real exchange rate and investigates the way the reversals occur. It defines as successful cases
reversals that occur primarily through nominal appreciations rather than through higher inflation
and calculates the probability of successful cases in the overall sample. The paper calculates the
                                               
1See also Krugman (1998), Sachs and Radelet (1998), Stiglitz (1998). Goldfajn and Baig (1998)
and Goldfajn and Gupta (1999) summarize this debate and present the main theoretical arguments.5
probability that a tight monetary policy, defined to be a case in which real interest rates in the
aftermath of the crises are higher than the average real interest rate during the 24 months
preceding the crises, is successful and compares with the overall probability of success. The
traditional approach would suggest that the probability of being successful is higher in cases where
tight monetary policy was implemented. Then, the whole exercise is replicated using only twin
crisis cases when currency crises coincide with banking crises and again the probability of success
is compared with the conditional probability of success when tight monetary policy is
implemented. In principle, one would expect tight monetary policies to be less successful when
a country is also experiencing a banking crisis. 
The results indicate that tight monetary policy increases substantially the probability of
success. For example, for undervaluations greater than 15 percent, the probability of success
increases from 26 percent to 37 percent when tight monetary policy is implemented. In contrast,
under some specifications, tight monetary policies reduce the probability of success when the
country is also experiencing problems in the banking sector.
The exercise in this paper differs from previous studies in a few important aspects. First,
it analyzes the relationship between interest rates and exchange rates in crisis episodes, crucial
periods for policy makers. This leaves out several interesting issues but allows the paper to
concentrate on the role of monetary policy in reestablishing currency stability after a large
collapse. Previous studies have looked at the general relationship between interest rates and
exchange rates but few studies have concentrated their analysis on crisis episodes.
2  Second, the
paper studies a large set of currency crises and, therefore, can offer more general results. Previous
studies have concentrated on specific currency crisis cases, offering more limited results.
3  Third,
the paper studies the relationship between real interest rates and real exchange rates using
monthly data as opposed to studying the relationship between the respective nominal variables
using daily data. The availability of a sufficient number of monthly data from the pooling of
countries allows the paper to refrain from extracting the relevant information from more noisy
daily data. In addition, the objective of the paper is to evaluate the relationship between tight
monetary policy and currency stabilization: both, in our view, are more precisely defined using the
real rather than the nominal variables. Finally, the recent research and availability of data on
banking crises allows us to evaluate the relationship between real interest rates and real exchange
rates in cases where currency and banking crises occur simultaneously.
The paper does not analyze the role of high interest rates in preventing a currency crisis,
as the focus is on the role of interest rates in reversing undervaluation following a currency crisis.
The former issue is analyzed in a contemporary paper by Kraay (1998). Quite interestingly Kraay
finds no evidence that “(a) interest rates set by the monetary authority systematically increase
during speculative attacks that do not culminate in the devaluation of the currency, or (b) increases
                                               
2 An exception is Kraay (1998).
3 For example, the Asian crises and the debate on the role of monetary policy has motivated a few
studies on the relationship between exchange rates and interest rates in the five or six most
affected countries. See Ghosh and Phillips (1998), Goldfajn and Baig (1998), and Kaminsky and
Schmukler (1998).6
in these interest rates lower the probability that a speculative attack culminates in the devaluation
of the currency.”
4
This paper is organized as follows. Section II explains the methodology and the data used
in the paper. Section III characterizes the undervaluation cases looking at their duration and
frequency. Section IV characterizes the reversals and evaluates the effect of monetary policy
providing the essential results in the paper. Section V analyzes the behavior of important
macroeconomic variables in currency crises, with and without tight monetary policy.  Section VI
presents the econometric analysis and section VII concludes.
II. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
    This paper analyzes all the episodes of currency collapses that resulted in large
undervaluations from a sample of 80 countries between January 1980- January 1998 and studies
the role of tight monetary policy in reversing the undervaluation through nominal appreciations
of the currency rather than through higher inflation. This exercise requires the definition of four
different objects.  First, one needs to define the term undervaluations and specify the threshold that
defines a “large” undervaluation. Second, the exercise requires the definition of what constitutes
a successful reversal, i.e., it requires a threshold for the proportion of the reversal to equilibrium
that is due to nominal appreciation of the currency (for example, is a reversal that is 50 percent
driven by nominal exchange appreciation a successful case?). Third, there is a need to define tight
monetary policy and, finally, one needs to specify how to evaluate whether tight monetary policy
has helped stabilize the exchange rate.
                                               
4The paper, however, uses central bank discount rates to measure the tightness of monetary
policy. It is well known that discount rates tend to remain flat and often do no reflect short run
tight policies (e.g. Swedish famous 500 percent interest rate defense in September 1992 was not
reflected in the discount rate that remained constant).7
A. Definition of Undervaluation and Cases
This paper defines undervaluation episodes as departures of the actual real exchange rate
from an estimated equilibrium real exchange rate. Specifically undervaluation is defined as
deviations of the actual exchange rate from a Hodrick-Prescott filtered series. The filtered series
captures stochastic trends in the series and allows us to concentrate on the cyclical behavior of
potentially non-stationary RER series. The filtered series represents the predicted equilibrium RER
and captures the permanent changes in the relative prices between countries while the estimated
undervaluation series represents the cyclical component of the RER movements since, as a
misalignment, it must eventually correct itself. This approach will also net out from the
undervaluation measure trends in the equilibrium RER, as for example the Balassa-Samuelson
effect.
5
The paper also defines the equilibrium real exchange rate as the predicted value of the
cointegrating regression between the actual real exchange rate and a set of fundamentals terms
of trade, openness, government size and international interest rate and calculates the
undervaluations as deviations from  this equilibrium value (see Goldfajn and Valdés (1996)). Since
the sample with fundamentals is more restricted, in the paper, we will use these RER series to test
for robustness of the results.
Chart 1 presents the definition of an undervaluation episode and its phases. We define the
start of an undervaluation case as the time when the difference between the actual RER and our
estimate of the steady state RER is equal to or higher than a certain threshold (e.g., 15 percent
or 25 percent). The undervaluation ends when this difference hits a second threshold associated
with the existence of no undervaluation. We define this second threshold as 5 percent. In order
to control for data blips, an episode has to be sustained for more than 2 consecutive months to be
classified as such.
    
We define four notable points: (I) Start, when the undervaluation hits the threshold, (ii)
End, when the undervaluation disappears i.e., the RER hits the 5 percent benchmark, (iii) Peak,
when the undervaluation is the highest, and (iv) History, when the undervaluation first reached
5 percent. An undervaluation episode is then defined as the Start-End period.
   
  There are also two phases: History-Peak, representing the build up of the overshooting
and Peak-End, representing the reversal to a “normal” level.
                                               
5 The Balassa-Samuelson effect occurs when a country's tradable sector productivity grows faster
than that of its trading partners ones and this differential growth is smaller in the nontradable
sector. Then the (cross-country) relative price of nontradables increases and, therefore, the RER
appreciates over time. See Rogoff [1992].8
B. Definition of Successful Reversals
   
  There are two ways to reverse an undervaluation through nominal currency appreciation
or through higher inflation at home than abroad (or a combination of the two). If avoiding an
inflation buildup is an important concern and/or nominal appreciation is desirable for the benefit
of domestic corporate balance sheets, the extent to which the reversals occur through nominal
appreciations is fundamental.
In order to decompose the real appreciation that occurs during the return to equilibrium
we calculate the total appreciation of the actual real exchange rate during the Peak-End phase, and
the total nominal appreciation during that same period. Successful reversals can then be defined
as episodes that return to equilibrium with higher than a certain threshold of nominal appreciation
of the currency.
Letting D  denote percentage change we have the identity:
    
                                      D RER ”D E +D (P-P*),                                                       (1)
    
where E and RER are the nominal and real effective exchange rate indices, and P and P* the price
indices at home and abroad, respectively. We can then calculate
    
                                       S=D E /DRER,                                                                      (2)
    
as our success index. As a starting point we define that a successful case occurs when the success
index S is greater than 50 percent. In the next section, we test the sensitivity of our results to
different thresholds for S.
C. Definition of Tight Monetary Policy
Ideally, one would like to have exogenous shocks to monetary policy in all the crisis
episodes. Clearly, there are no such data available. This paper identifies that a country is
experiencing a tight monetary policy when the average real interest rate during the period of
undervaluation, r, exceeds a threshold real interest rate. The latter is calculated as the average real
interest rate during the 24 months preceding the crises and is denoted by mr , plus x times the
standard deviation of the series, sr . i.e.
                                         r  > mr + xsr                                                                                       (3)
As a starting point, we have set x equal to zero in the benchmark case but sensitivity
analysis is performed.
There are several possible ways to calculate real interest rates depending on how expected
inflation is proxied.
6 In this paper we calculate expected inflation by taking the following month’s
inflation. The real interest rate in period t is then calculated by taking the quarterly moving average
of real interest rates, centered at t.
                                               
6 See Goldfajn and Baig (1998).9
The paper evaluates the results under different definitions of the real interest rate and
tightness definitions.
D. How to Determine Whether Tight Monetary Policy has been Effective?
The paper defines that monetary policy has been effective if we find that the conditional
probability of reversing an undervaluation through nominal appreciations using tight policy is
higher than the unconditional probability  (or higher than the probability conditional on not using
tight policy). In other words, we consider that monetary policy has been effective if out of the
cases that had tight monetary policies we observe a larger proportion of success than the
proportion of success observed in the overall sample.
The main tables of the paper compare the conditional probabilities of success under tight
or non tight policies for different thresholds and definitions. In particular, we will evaluate the
probability of success of tight monetary policy with and without a banking crisis.
E. Data Description
Our sample consists of monthly data for 80 countries (see the Appendix for a list of the
countries in the sample during the period January 1980 to January 1998).
7  The monthly data on
nominal interest rates were obtained from International Financial Statistics (IFS). For nominal
interest rates we used the series for money market rate and treasury bill rate. In a few cases where
none of the above series was available the series for deposit rate or discount rate was used.
The data on seasonally adjusted CPI, nominal effective exchange rate and the real effective
exchange rate were obtained from the Information Notice System (INS).
8 The use of the INS
effective real exchange rate should, in principle, consider the effect of  “competitive devaluations”
in third markets.
The existence of banking crises is summarized by a dummy series.
9 The dates of banking
crises have been obtained from Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1998), Caprio and Klingebiel (1996)
and Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997).  Since these studies provide only annual data,
monthly data was interpolated by assuming that the crisis lasted from the January of the year in
which it started till the December of the year in which it ended.
                                               
7  We started with the same set of 93 countries as included in Goldfajn and Valdes (1996),
however because of the unavailability of the data some countries had to be dropped and the final
sample consisted of 80 countries.
8 The nominal and real exchange rates have been defined such that an increase is an appreciation.
9 The problems in the banking sector may exist in one or both of the following forms. First the
banks may be unsound, i.e. they may have a high share of non-performing assets in their portfolio
and second there may be a run on banks. We include both types of cases to define a fragile
banking sector.10
 III. CHARACTERIZING UNDERVALUATION (OR CRISES)
In this section we present several characteristics of the undervaluation episodes in our
sample. In particular we analyze the number of episodes with different magnitudes of
undervaluation, the average duration of the undervaluation episodes, the proportion of cases in
which banking problems were also experienced, i.e. the twin crises cases, and the proportion of
cases  in which the monetary policy was tight.
A. Number of Cases
The number of episodes clearly depends on the cutoff that defines undervaluation. We
identified 99 cases of undervaluation using a 10 percent cutoff, i.e. there are 99 cases in our
sample where the real exchange rate has overshot by at least 10 percent. As we make the
definition stricter by raising the cutoff, the number of undervaluation cases declines. Thus, while
the number of cases with more than 15 percent undervaluation declines to 77, there are just 28
cases in which the real exchange rate is found to be undervalued by more than 30 percent. These
results are presented in Table 1.
Table 1 also shows the proportion of banking crises in the sample. We identified about 45-
55 percent of the undervaluation cases to be twin crises cases, i.e. we find that about half of the
undervaluation cases are accompanied by a fragile banking sector.
10 This confirms previous results
in the literature that find strong evidence for the simultaneous occurrence of banking and currency
crises. The proportion of these cases increases for larger thresholds of undervaluations. This
means that once the degree of undervaluation reaches 15 percent, further undervaluation alters
the likelihood of having a banking crises.
We find the monetary policy to be tight in nearly one third of the cases with more than 10
percent undervaluation.  The percentage of such cases declines when the threshold to define
undervaluation is increased.
B. Duration of Undervaluations
We also examine the average duration for which the real exchange rate remained
undervalued after a currency crisis. The average duration is found to be about 30 months for the
cases with more than 15 percent undervaluation, i.e. on average the undervaluation persisted for
about two and a half years. The average build up phase, i.e. the History-Peak phase, is 9.5 months,
which is considerably shorter than the phase of reversal, i.e. the Peak-End phase, which takes
about 20.4 months. These results are summarized in Table 2.
We also present a frequency histogram of the duration of the build up phase and the
reversal phase in Chart 2. As can be seen from the chart there is a great asymmetry in the duration
of these two phases. On one hand, in more than 45 percent of the cases, the build up takes only
                                               
10 See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) and Gupta (1997) for evidence on the existence of the twin
crises and various explanations of why such crises may arise.11
1-3 months, and in almost 80 percent of the cases it takes less than 1 year. On the other hand,
reversal takes much longer, in only 35 percent of the cases reversal takes less than 1 year.
IV. CHARACTERIZING REVERSALS AND THE EFFECT OF MONETARY POLICY
In this section we address the main questions raised in this paper. What is the probability
that a reversal occurs through nominal appreciation rather than through higher inflation? What is
the effect of a tight monetary policy on the probability of successful reversals? Does the condition
of the banking system alter the effectiveness of monetary policy?
We first analyze the proportion of success cases. Then we identify the proportion of
success in cases in which interest rates were kept high. In light of the recent debate on how the
state of the banking system may influence the relationship between interest and exchange rates,
 we analyze the effect of  the health of the banking sector on the probability of successful reversal.
A. Unconditional Reversals: Proportion of Nominal Appreciation versus Inflationary
Returns
We first analyze the success cases for undervaluations of at least 15 percent. We consider
several alternative definitions of success by varying the percentage of reversal that is required to
be brought through nominal appreciations. The results are contained in Table 3 and Chart 3. The
number of success cases declines when a stricter definition is used.
In Chart 4 we present the probability of reversal through nominal appreciation for varying
degrees of undervaluation. We define successful cases as the ones in which nominal appreciation
of the exchange rate is responsible for at least 50 percent of the reversal in the real exchange rate.
We find that in a significant number of cases the reversal comes through a nominal appreciation
of the currency, e.g. 35 percent of the undervaluation cases of more than 10 percent have been
found to be success cases. The percentage of success cases declines for undervaluations of higher
magnitudes but not significantly. Thus, about 29 percent of the undervaluations of greater than
30 percent were reversed through nominal appreciations. This implies that the magnitude of the
overshooting does not affect significantly the probability of reversing the undervaluation through
nominal appreciations.
B. Conditional Reversals: Proportion of Successful Cases with Tight Monetary Policy
Table 4 and Chart 5 address one of the main questions of the paper, what is the effect of
tight monetary policy in bringing the reversal through nominal appreciation. The probability of
success, conditional on using tight monetary policy, is substantially higher than the probability of
success, conditional on non tight policy. Thus while the probability of success is only 26 percent
for undervaluation of at least 15 percent for the non tight sample, the probability increases to 38
percent when tight monetary policy is used.  This result is confirmed for all the different degrees
of undervaluation.
 Thus the results could lend support to the use of tight monetary policy for the purpose
of correcting undervaluation of the currency. However, one has to interpret the results with
caution. Since there is no true exogenous policy variable in this exercise, the higher incidence of
successes under high real rates could be driven by the effect of a third factor.12
Notwithstanding this caveat the fact that our results do show a positive correlation
between tight policies and nominal appreciations is interesting. A typical “endogeneity” argument
advanced is that interest rates and exchange rates are both driven by the deterioration in investor’s
confidence during the crisis. The latter increases risk premium and, consequently, interest rates
and, at the same time, depresses the exchange rate. This would typically generate a negative
correlation but not a positive correlation as obtained here.
C. Proportion of Successful Cases also with Banking Problems
A vulnerable banking and corporate sector raises the often mentioned tradeoff between
banking sector fragility and exchange rate stability,  that a policy maker faces while choosing the
monetary policy. The policy maker may be less willing to raise the interest rate to defend the
currency when the banking and or corporate sector are exposed to the interest rate increases.
11
This is compounded by the fact that interest increases may affect the expected return of an
investor. Interest rates may affect the probability of default by increasing the debt servicing burden
of the corporations, by depressing the economy and reducing profits, by altering the net worth of
corporations adversely exposed to interest rate changes, or, finally, by affecting the health of the
banking system that tends to be naturally exposed to interest rate changes.
12
In fact, we find that the policy makers choose tight policies less often when they are
simultaneously facing a banking crisis. In Table 6, we find that the unconditional probability of
 choosing a tight monetary policy is higher than the probability of choosing a tight policy
conditioned on having a banking crisis. For example, the probability of choosing tight monetary
policy declines from 29 percent in the entire sample to 25 percent in the twin crises cases, for
undervaluations of at least 15 percent.
Moreover, when tight monetary policy is adopted it diminishes the probability of a
successful recovery.  Table 5 and Chart 6 shows that the probability of success falls from 45
percent to 29 percent when tight monetary policies are adopted, for undervaluations greater than
15 percent.  This means that the relationship between high interest rates and stable currencies
hinges crucially on the state of the banking system.
13
                                               
11 Other factors affecting the monetary policy may include the stock of government debt and the
increased burden of debt servicing.
12 Ideally one would like to analyze the effect of the health of the banking as well as the corporate
sector on the reversal process and on the relationship between real interest  rate and real exchange
rate. However, because of the data limitations we just analyze the effect of the banking sector.
13 An important caveat for this result is that there are very few cases in our sample in which tight
policy was used in the presence of banking problems.13
V. MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES UNDER TIGHT AND NONTIGHT MONETARY POLICY
Even if one accepts that tight monetary policy helps to stabilize the exchange rate one also
needs to take into account the costs involved in raising interest rates and weigh them against the
benefits. The natural sequence for this paper is to look at the effect of tight monetary policy on
output growth, inflation and debt service.
In this section we analyze the behavior of growth rate of output, inflation, current account
(as a percentage of GDP) and debt servicing (as a percentage of GDP) in currency crises, under
tight and non tight monetary policy. We follow a methodology developed in Eichengreen et al.
(1995), which has also been used by Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998). We first calculate the
average value of the variable during the tranquil periods, where tranquil periods include all the
years in the sample, 1980-1998, excluding the years of undervaluation. Then we take the deviation
of the variable during a few years around the time of undervaluation from the average value. A
positive value in any of the years indicates that the value of the variable is higher during that year
than the average of the tranquil periods. We distinguish between the cases with tight monetary
policy (TMP cases) and those with non tight monetary policy (NTP cases) and compare the
behavior of the variables.
For this exercise, data on GDP, nominal exchange rate, current account and Inflation were
obtained from the IMF’s IFS data base. The data on debt servicing were obtained from the World
Bank, Global Development Finance. It measures the ratio of interest payments on external debt
to GNP.
Charts 7 to 10 depict the behavior of the variables inflation, current account, debt
servicing and growth rate of GDP respectively around the crisis period. Each chart shows the
behavior of the variable for the whole sample (the broken line) and for the reduced samples of
tight monetary policy (the plain line) and non tight monetary policy (the dotted line). In the charts
we focus on the year before the undervaluation, C-1, the year when it started, C, and the next four
years, C+1,..,C+4.
Chart 7 shows that during the  undervaluation periods inflation starts out  higher than the
average of tranquil period and then declines. Inflation is higher in the tight monetary cases than
in the non-tight cases to begin with and then declines more sharply. This is consistent with the
result that tight monetary policy are more succesful. Chart 8 shows that the current account is
lower than the average before the undervaluation but improves and becomes higher afterwards.
Moreover, it is more negative in tight cases before and during the year of the undervaluation, but
improves and stays above the level of non tight cases afterwards. Chart 9 shows that during the
periods of undervaluations, the burden of debt servicing is higher than the average. Moreover,
debt servicing is relatively higher for the tight cases. Finally, Chart 10 shows the behavior of the
growth rate of output. Here we find that the growth is smaller during the undervaluation periods
than the average. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that the recovery of output is sharper in tight
cases than in non tight cases. This result may be attributed to the fact that the tight monetary
policy is usually associated with more successful reversals, therefore, with an economy recovering
with relatively less inflation and more nominal appreciations.14
VI. PANEL DATA ESTIMATION AND LIMITATION
The analysis so far treated each currency crisis as a single event and did not analyze the
time series relationship between interest rates and exchange rates in the aftermath of currency
crises. To fill this gap, we further analyze the effectiveness of monetary policy in correcting the
undervaluation in RER estimating a fixed effects model using monthly panel data. We consider
 undervaluations greater than 15 percent  and hence consider 77 episodes of undervaluation for
this exercise. The panel data consists of time series observations for the cases of undervaluation.
Since the duration of undervaluation differed across cases, we estimated the model with an
unbalanced panel.
We estimated the model by regressing the deviation of the real exchange rate from the
equilibrium exchange rate, RER,  (which measures the extent of undervaluation ) on  real interest
rates,  controlling for the case-specific fixed effects. The model specification is given as
                                      yi t = ai + bxit + uit                                              (4)
where y is the deviation of real exchange rate from equilibrium, subscript i refers to the ith case
and t to the time period. Notice that t is different across cases. a is a constant term which is
assumed to differ across cases. x denotes the real interest rate and u is the error term with mean
zero and constant variance.
Table 7 contains the main results from this regression exercise. The coefficient on the  real
 interest rate is found to be positive and highly significant (at the one percent level), which implies
that high real interest rates help in correcting undervaluation.
In light of the recent debate on the effectiveness of monetary policy in the presence of a
fragile banking sector, it would also be interesting to see how the latter affects the relationship
between the RER and the interest rate. Hence we divided the sample into two subsamples.  One
subsample included the observations when along with undervaluation the country is  also
experiencing a fragile banking sector, i.e. the twin crises cases, and a second subsample  included
the observations  when the  banking sector is supposedly  healthy, i.e. just the currency crisis
cases. We re-estimated the model separately for these subsets of observations. The results are
presented in columns two and three of Table 7. The coefficient on the real interest rate is again
positive and significant at the one percent level of significance for both the currency crises only
and the twin crises only. This result shows that once the time series dimension is taken into
account, the relationship between real interest rates and exchange rates is positive, even when
including economies facing banking crisis.
The econometric analysis presented above gives rise to some endogeneity and sample
selection issues. It may be argued that if the choice of monetary policy is endogenous to inflation
and real exchange rate, then our results on the effectiveness of monetary policy would be biased,
for example, the government may have a reaction function whereby it increases the interest rates
if inflation picks up. However, this kind of behavior would only give a downward bias to our
results as it implies that there would be more cases of high inflation (i.e. more unsuccessful cases)
associated with high interest rates.15
Second it may be argued that the analysis suffers from the omitted variables problem. It
is possible that a third factor, as for example loss of confidence of foreign investors, may increase
both interest rates and exchange rates. Thus we may see high interest rates associated with more
unsuccessful cases, but it need not imply causality between the two variables. Truly we cannot say
anything about causality here, but as far as the direction of bias goes, if anything the presence of
such common factors would provide a downward bias to our results.
Third, our analysis may also suffer from the sample selection problem, i.e. we tend to
exclude the cases where tough governments (and hence tight monetary policy) are able to prevent
crises and, therefore, are not included in our sample.  In this case we should observe fewer cases
of tight policy and less success out of our sample. This again will bias the result encountered in
the paper. However, we do find that  about 30 percent of our cases have tight monetary policy
and these cases are relatively more successful.
Finally tight monetary policy may be accompanied by a whole package of reforms. It




This paper provides empirical evidence on the debate about the effectiveness of tight
monetary policy  in stabilizing exchange rates in the aftermath of currency crises. Although
exogenous monetary policy variables are not available, at least not for a large set of countries, and
true causality claims cannot be offered, the relationships encountered in this paper provide food
for thought.
The paper finds that in a large set of undervaluations in the aftermath of currency crises,
tight monetary policy increases substantially the probability of reversing undervaluation through
nominal appreciation rather than through higher inflation. The paper also finds that when the
country is also facing a banking crisis tight policies decrease the probability of a reversal through
currency appreciation, although this result is reversed in the panel data econometric analysis.
Another finding of the paper is that in tight monetary policy cases current account reverses
faster, inflation is lower, debt service larger and, paradoxically, output recovers faster than in the
non tight monetary policy cases.
                                               
14 Some, but not all of these issues, are addressed in a forthcoming paper entitled “Overshootings
and Reversals: The Role of Monetary Policy.” To address the endogeneity issues we estimate a
model using only cross section data, with 77 episodes of undervaluation, and use central bank
independence index as an instrument. We thank Aaart Kray for the data and suggestion.16
REFERENCES
Baig, Taimur and Ilan Goldfajn, 1998, “Financial Market Contagion in the Asian Crisis,” IMF 
Working Paper.
Caprio, G. J. and D. Klingebiel, 1996, “Bank Insolvency: Bad Luck, Bad Policy or Bad
Banking?” Paper presented at the World Bank Conference on Development Economics.
Demirguc-Kunt, and Enrica Detragiache, 1997, “The Determinants of Banking Crises: Evidence
from Industrial and Developing Countries.” IMF Working Paper no. 97/106.
Drazen, Allan, and Paul Masson 1994, “Credibility of Policies versus Credibility of Policy
makers,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(3), August, pages. 735-54.
Dornbusch, Rudiger, 1976, “Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics,” Journal of Political
Economy, 84(6), December, pages. 1161-76.
Eichengreen, Barry, Andrew Rose and Charles Wyplosz, 1994, “Speculative Attacks on Pegged
Exchange Rates: An Empirical Exploration with Special Reference to the European 
Monetary System,” NBER Working Paper 4898.
Furman, Jason and Joseph Stiglitz, 1998, “Economic Crises: Evidence and Insights from East
Asia”, Paper Prepared for Brookings Panel on Economic Activity, Washington DC,
September 3-4.
Gupta, Poonam, 1997, “Twin Crises: Models and Evidence”, mimeo, University of Maryland.
Ghosh, Atish, and Steven Phillips, 1998,  “Interest Rates, Stock Markets Prices and Exchange
Rates in East Asia” (unpublished, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC).
Goldfajn, Ilan and Taimur Baig, 1998, “Monetary Policy in the Aftermath of Currency Crises: 
The Case of Asia” IMF Working Paper.
Goldfajn, Ilan, and Rodrigo Valdés, 1998, “The Aftermath of Appreciations,” Forthcoming
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol 114, no 1.
Goldfajn, Ilan, and Poonam Gupta, 1999, “Overshootings and Reversals: The Role of Monetary
Policy”, Forthcoming.
Kaminsky, G.L. and C.M. Reinhart, 1998, “The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance
of Payments Problems” forthcoming in AER.
Kaminsky, Graciela and S. Schmukler, 1998, “The Relationship Between Interest Rates and 
Exchange Rates in Six Asian Countries,” (unpublished, The World Bank, Washington, 
DC).17
Kindelberger, Charles P., 1978, Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises.
(New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers).
Kraay, Aart, 1998, “Do High Interest Rates Defend Currencies During Speculative Attacks?”, 
Mimeo.
Krugman, Paul, 1998a,  “What Happened to Asia?” At internet website http://web.mit.edu.
Krugman, Paul, 1998b, “Will Asia Bounce Back?” At internet website http://web.mit.edu.
Lindgren, C., G. Garcia and M.I. Saal, 1996, “Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy”, 
IMF.
Milesi-Ferretti, Gian and Assaf Razin, 1998, “Current Account Reversals and currency crises: 
Empirical Regularities”, IMF Working Paper, WP/98/89.
Radelet, Steven, and Jeffrey Sachs, 1998, “The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies,
Prospects,” Paper prepared for the Brookings Panel  (Washington: Brookings Institute).
Stiglitz, Joseph, 1998, “Knowledge for Development: Economic Science, Economic Policy and
Economic Advice ” Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics (Washington:
The World Bank).18









Proportion of Cases 
w/ Banking Crises 3/
10 99 32.3 41.4
15 77 29.2 45.4
20 49 22.5 46.9
25 36 17.2 50.0
30 28 13.6 57.1
Source: authors’ calculations.
1/ Percentage misalignment with respect to constructed real exchange rate 
equilibrium.
             2/  Tight Policy defined as real interest larger than average in previous 24 
months. 
3/ Banking Crises dummy as in Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1998) and others.






1/ Total episode defined from History to End. Build Up from History 
to Peak  and Reversal from Peak to End  (See Chart 1).19
Table 3: Unconditional Probabilities as a function of Success Definition
                                                   









1/ Cases with undervaluations greater than 15 percent considered. 













10 0.35 0.38 0.28  *
15 0.32 0.37 0.26 *
20 0.29 0.33 0.19          
25 0.31 0.40 0.21
30 0.29 0.33 0.26
Source: authors’ calculations.
1/ Success defined as  50 percent of Reversal through nominal appreciation. 
                       2/ *Indicates that the probabilities are different at a significance level greater 
     than 85 percent.20













10 0.33 0.38 0.43
15 0.34 0.29 0.45 *
20 0.30 0.25 0.36 *
Source: authors’ calculations.
1/ Success defined as  50 percent of Reversal through nominal appreciation.                    
2/ *Indicates that the probabilities are different at  a significance level greater than 85 
     percent.










1/ Success defined as  50 percent of Reversal through nominal appreciation.                    21
      Table 7: Panel Data Regressions of RER 1/
Sample Coefficient 2/ t-stat
Entire sample  .1467 *     13.6      
Only  Twin Crises
Cases  







        
1/   Dependent variable is deviation of RER from the equilibrium value and the
independent variable is        Real Interest Rate.
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Chart 4: Probability of Reversing Undervaluations through Nominal Appreciations24

























































































































All cases Tight Monetary Policy Non Tight Policy


























































All Cases Tight Monetary Policy Non Tight Policy26



















































































































































































































All cases Tight Monetary Policy Non Tight Policy27
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